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Part One

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: THE 1990-1991 TERM
Elliot M. Mincberg"
To paraphrase the old saying, the 1990-91 Term of the
Supreme Court ended not with a whimper, but with a bang. The
close of the Term witnessed not only the resignation of Justice
Thurgood Marshall, but also a heated exchange among the justices
on an increasingly sensitive and important subject: overturning prior
court precedents protecting individual rights. In a 5-4 decision
issued on the last day of the Term overruling a 2-year-old precedent
on the use of victim impact statements in capital cases, the
conservative Court majority "displayed an enthusiasm for overruling
precedents" in previous constitutional rights cases.' According to
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, the Court should be free
to overturn even recent precedents in the individual rights area,
those decided by narrow margins over "spirited
particularly
2
dissents.,

In the last of his own spirited dissents on the Court, Justice
Legal Director, People For The American Way, Washington, D.C.; B.A. 1974,
Northwestern University; J.D. 1977, Harvard University. The author and People

For The American Way gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Kirk
Henderson and Carshena Bailey, summer legal interns at People For The American
Way, without whose work this article would not have been possible.
' See David 0. Stewart, "Four Spirited Dissenters" 77 A.B.A. J. 40 (Sept. 1991).
2 Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2611 (1991).
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Marshall strenuously protested? Marshall warned that the Court
was sending a "clear signal that scores of established constitutional
liberties are now ripe for reconsideration" as a result of changes in
the Court's "personnel."4 His opinion included an "endangered
precedents" list of 16 recent 5-4 decisions upholding individual rights
that could be subject to overruling.' "Power, not reason," Justice
Marshall 6 wrote, "is the new currency of this Court's decisionmaking."
In light of the clear and open division on the Court with
respect to precedents concerning individual rights, careful review of
the Court's decisions in this area is particularly important. The
Court's rulings concerning the First Amendment warrant especially
close scrutiny. A number of important recent precedents protecting
First Amendment rights were included on Justice Marshall's
"endangered precedents" list, and several more could be added as
well.7 Indeed, the Court has already announced that it will review
two decisions that could provide an opportunity to overrule or limit
several key precedents protecting First Amendment rights.'
While no decisions protecting First Amendment liberties were
expressly overruled during the 1990-91 Term, this year did witness
Id. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'Id.
s Id. at 2623 n.2.
6 Id. at 2619.
7 Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2623 n.2 (1991) (listing Rutan v.
Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990) (First Amendment right not to
be denied public employment due to party affiliation); Peel v. Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990) (First Amendment right to
advertise legal specialization); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (First
Amendment right of public employee to express views on public issues)). See also,
e.g., United States v. Eichmann, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (5-4 decision invalidating
federal flag desecration law on First Amendment grounds).
' Specifically, the Court has accepted for review in 1991-92 the decision in Lee
v. Weisman, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1305 (1991),
concerning the constitutionality of school-sponsored prayer at high school
graduations. The United States has already urged the Court to reconsider its
seminal decision on church-state separation and the Establishment Clause in Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at
8, Lee v. Weisman, cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1305 (1991) (No. 90-1014). The Court has
also agreed to review the decision in In re R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991),
upholding a Minnesota anti-cross burning ordinance, which could provide an
occasion for the Court to reconsider or limit its decision concerning flag-burning
laws in Eichmann, 110 S. Ct. at 2404.
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the continuation of several disturbing trends in the Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence. The Court rendered six decisions on the
merits concerning freedom of expression or freedom of the press this
Term; in all six, the press or free expression advocates lost.9
The majority opinion in several of these cases, while not
expressly overruling prior precedent, substantially limited or eroded
previous decisions by the Court protecting First Amendment rights.
For example, by permitting the federal government to require family
planning clinics receiving federal funds to severely limit abortionrelated speech, the decision in Rust v. Sullivan" undermined
established precedent concerning government imposition of
unconstitutional conditions on speech."
Several decisions this Term also suggest that continuing
dangers to First Amendment principles may be posed by the line of
reasoning employed by Justice Scalia last year to severely limit the
right to free exercise of religion in Employment Division v. Smith. 2
In Smith, Scalia's opinion for the Court effectively rewrote decades
of past Court precedent and ruled that the First Amendment offers
virtually no protection for infringements on religious liberty caused
by laws or rules of general applicability which do not explicitly
target a religious practice. 3 This Term, Justice Scalia sought to
apply the same rationale to free expression cases. In Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 4 Scalia argued that the First Amendment did not apply
' See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (rejecting First Amendment
challenge to federal abortion "gag rule" regulations); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
111 S.Ct. 2456 (1991) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to state's prohibition
of non-obscene nude dancing); Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S.Ct. 2720 (1991) (rejecting
First Amendment challenge to rule barring speech by attorneys concerning pending
cases); Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991) (rejecting First
Amendment challenge to imposition of liability on press for disclosure of name of
confidential source); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991)

(rejecting First Amendment challenge to state libel rules); Leathers v. Medlock, 111
S. Ct. 1438 (1991) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to differential application
of tax to media).
10111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
11Rust is discussed in further detail in Section I, infra. See also, e.g., discussion
of Barnes, 111 S.Ct. at 2456, in Section L infra.
12 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
13Id. at 1602-03. See also id. at 1606 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that
majority opinion in Smith "dramatically departs from well-settled First Amendment
jurisprudence" and is "incompatible with our Nation's fundamental commitment
to individual religious liberty").

14111 S.Ct. 2456 (1991).
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at all to Indiana's attempt to ban non-obscene nude dancing through
a public indecency law because the statute was a general law
regulating conduct not specifically directed at expression." Atkh
the majority upheld Indiana's action in Barnes, no other justice agreed
with Scalia's rationale which would have effectively overruled
decades of Supreme Court precedent protecting expressive conduct.
But a 5-4 majority including Scalia did rely on similar reasoning in
another First Amendment case, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,1 6 where

the Court ruled that the First Amendment does not require special
scrutiny of Minnesota's generally applicable promissory estoppel
doctrine despite its potential negative effects on freedom of the press.
Justice Souter pointedly disagreed in dissent and may have set the
stage for future disagreements on this issue, noting that generally
applicable rules may pose just as severe a threat to First Amendment
interests as statutes targeted specifically at the press, religious liberty,
or freedom of speech.'
The remainder of this article will analyze in more detail each
of the Court's eight First Amendment decisions during the 1990-91
Term. These rulings fall into three categories: free expression,
freedom of association, and freedom of the press.
I. THE CouRT'S DECISIONS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH
The 1990-91 term witnessed four free speech decisions, each
of which will be discussed in deatail below. In the three cases in
which the Court reached the merits, the majority upheld contentspecific regulations by five-four votes. In the fourth, the Court let
stand a content-based restriction without reaching the merits. The
net result of these decisions is to erode First Amendment protections
and forebode a troubling direction for free speech jurisprudence.
A. Rust v. Sullivan
The Court's controversial decision in Rust v. Sullivan"
concerned regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) that restricted abortion-related information
" The decision in Barnes, including Scalia's concurring opinion, is discussed in
more detail in Section I, infra.
16111S. Ct. 2513 (1991). Cowles is discussed in more detail in Section III, infra.
71d.
I at 2522-23 (Souter, J., dissenting).
111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
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a doctor at a Title X clinic 9 could provide to a patient.2' The
regulations were issued pursuant to the Public Health Service Act of
1970 (the Act).2' The Act, while expressly forbidding public funding
of abortions,' was aimed at providing comprehensive medical
Until 1988, HHS regulations
services for all who needed it.'
allowed federally-funded clinics to refer women to abortion
In 1988, however, the Reagan Administration
providers.2
announced new regulations providing that recipients of federal funds
"may not encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a method of
Pregnant women must be "provided with
family planning."2'
information necessary to protect the health of mother and unborn
' even if they ask specifically about referral to an abortion
child,"26
The First' and .Tenth' Circuits struck down the
facility.V
regulations as violating the First and Fifth Amendments, while the
Second Circuit upheld the regulations."0 The. Supreme Court
accepted the Second Circuit decision for review."'
In a closely divided five-four decision written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit.32 The
Court's initial inquiry was whether the regulations were consistent
9 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-6 (1982 & Supp. 1990) (funding public and non-profit
private organizations to provide family planning information).
Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1764-65.
42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-6 (1982 & Supp. 1990).
Id. § 300a-6.

Id.§300(1), (5).
2

53 Fed. Reg. 2922, 2923 (1988).
42 C.F.R. § 59.10 (1990).
Id. § 59.8(a)(2).

2

Id. § 59.8(b)(3), (4), (5) (examples of how to respond when the patient asks for

2
2

referral to an abortion provider). If asked about an abortion referral, the doctor is
directed to state that "the project does not consider abortion an appropriate method
of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer for abortion." Id. at §
59.8(b)(5).
' Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 899 F.2d 53 (1st Cir.
1990) (en banc).
I Planned Parenthood Fed'n of America v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492 (10th Cir.

1990).
0 New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989).
Rust v. Sullivan, 110 S. Ct 2559 (1990).

31

32

Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1764 (1991).
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with the Act. Citing the Act's allegedly ambiguous language,' the
Court deferred to HHS's 1988 interpretation as a rational reading of
the language.' Since the Act does not address explicitly the issues
of counseling, referral, or advocacy, the majority declared that HHS's
regulations on these issues were authorized by the statute.'
Moving to the First Amendment issue, the Court held that
the regulations did not limit impermissibly the speech of those in
Title X programs. The majority ruled that the government may make
a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion and spend public
funds accordingly.' Encouraging a project pursuant to legislative
policy, the Court claimed, is not the same as interfering with a
protected right.3 7 A program that favors childbirth, consequently,
does not necessarily interfere with the protected rights of free speech
or abortion, according to the Court.
The Court then characterized the prohibition on speech not
as a content-based restriction, but merely as funding only what was
within the statutory grant of authority. Since public funds may not
be used "where abortion is a method of family planning," provision
of abortion-related information would be outside the scope of the
project.3
The majority next considered the regulation in the context of
the "unconstitutional conditions" line of cases. These decisions
provide that "even though the government may deny [a] ...benefit

for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the
government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on
a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests -' The language at issue is as follows: "None of the funds appropriated under
this subchapter shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family
planning." 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1982).
34Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1767-68 (1991). The Court applied and appeared to extend
even further the test set out in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). According to the Chevron test as
interpreted in Rust, if a statute is silent or ambiguous about the issue being
considered, the Court should defer to the agency's interpretation when it is a
permissible or plausible construction of the statutory language and it otherwise
does not conflict with congressional intent. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1767.
3sId. at 1767-69.
s Id. at 1772 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
71d.
I

(quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 475).

Id. at 1772-73.
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'
especially, his [or her] interest in freedom of speech."39
The Court
distinguished such holdings from Rust by claiming that the
regulations placed conditions on the Title X program, not on the
recipient of the program. The recipient would still be free to engage
in abortion-related advocacy, so long as this was done outside the
scope of the Title X program.' The Court further suggested that
participation in a Title X program is voluntary and if the regulations
are deemed to be too restrictive, the participant is free to decline the
federal subsidies and the associated regulations. '
In addition, the majority ruled that precedents dealing with
restrictions of speech in areas "traditionally open to the public for
expressive activity" were inapplicable.' While federal funds cannot
3
justify regulating speech in some forums such as college campuses,
the Court did not reach the question of whether the doctor-patient
relationship is equivalent to such a forum. Instead, the Court simply
asserted that "Title X program regulations do not significantly
impinge upon the doctor-patient relationship."" The Court claimed
that doctors do not have to represent any opinion as their own that
they do not in fact hold, that women do not have an expectation of
comprehensive medical advice at Title Xclinics, and that doctors can
say that abortion advice is beyond the scope of the program.'
According to the majority, the regulations thus do not impermissibly
regulate speech.*

Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). Accord, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984).

oRust, 111 S. Ct. at 1774.
at 1775 n.5.
at 1776.

41Id.
42Id.

' In this regard, the Court said that the "university is a traditional sphere of
free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that the
Government's ability to control speech within that sphere by means of conditions
attached to the expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the vagueness

and overbreadth doctrines of the First Amendment." Id.(citing Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603, 605-06 (1967)).
"Rust, 111 S.Ct. at 1776.
45 id.

"The Court also said the regulations do not impinge upon a woman's Fifth
Amendment right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy because the
regulations leave the woman in no different a position than if Title X had not been

passed. Id. at 1777. Since refusal to fund abortions is constitutional, see Webster
v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), the majority stated, the less
extreme measure of prohibiting abortion-related services from federally funded

8
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Justice Blackmun, along with Justices Marshall, Stevens, and
O'Connor, dissented.47 All four of the dissenting justices believed
the Court unnecessarily reached the constitutional issues.'
Departing from the traditional conservative doctrine of construing a
statute to avoid constitutional difficulties, the dissent explained, the
majority improperly read the statute to invite constitutional problems
that could have been avoided by ruling that Congress did not
authorize the issuance of constitutionally troubling regulations.49
The dissenting justices further explained that the regulations
should have been struck down as beyond the scope of the
authorizing statute.' Neither the language of the enabling statute
nor its legislative history expressly authorize or mandate the
regulations."' The statute simply provides that none of the "funds
appropriated under this subchapter shall be used in programs where
abortion is a method of family planning."' 2 The majority conceded
that this provision does not address directly counseling or referral
and, furthermore, that- this provision's corresponding history is
ambiguous.' The dissent posited that, at the very least, Congress
clinics is also constitutional. The Court suggested that the regulations also do not
restrict the amount of abortion-related information that a woman may receive
because all non-Title X clinics still may counsel a woman as they see fit - only
Title X programs may not advise about abortion. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1777.
"Rust, 111 S.Ct. at 1778 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
4 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 1787 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1789
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
41Id. at 1778-79 (Blackmun J., dissenting); id. at 1788 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id.
at 1788-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent attacked the Court's claim that
the regulations "do not raise the sort of 'grave and doubtful constitutional
questions,' ... that would lead us to assume Congress did not intend to authorize
their issuance." Id. (quoting id. at 1771). Justice Blackmun explained that "[w]hether
or not one believes that these regulations are valid, it avoids reality to contend that
they do not give rise to serious constitutional questions." Id. at 1778 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). That two of the three circuits to have considered the regulations struck
them down as unconstitutional and four Supreme Court justices would have done
likewise demonstrates the troubling nature of the regulations. Id. at 1779.
oId. at 1778 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 1787 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id.
at 1789 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1779 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
5242 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1982 & Supp. 1990).
53Rust, 111 S.Ct. at 1779 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 1767, 1768).
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did not intend for HHS to censor speech between doctor and
patient.' Given this uncertainty, the dissent would have struck
down the statute because a plainly constitutional construction of the
Act "is not only 'fairly possible' but entirely reasonable." 5
Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens also dissented on
the First Amendment issues.' Noting the significance of the case,
the dissent explained that the Court had never before upheld
viewpoint-based restrictions on speech as a condition upon the
receipt of public funds.5 7 The regulations at issue not only restrict
information about abortion options, but compel anti-abortion
speech. ' This forces the clinics "to be an instrument for fostering
public adherence to an ideological point of view [they may] find[ .
. . unacceptable."' The dissent pointedly noted that as a result, a
patient's normal expectation that her physician would communicate
all relevant information about the condition which was the reason for
the visit would be frustrated and unfulfilled. 6'
The dissent also attacked the majority's analysis of the
Court's precedents concerning unconstitutional conditions. The
majority's claim that no unconstitutional conditions attach because
the doctors remain free to advocate abortion outside of the Title X
54

Id. at 1788 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that "[iln a society that abhors
censorship and in which policymakers have traditionally placed the highest value
on the freedom to communicate, it is unrealistic to conclude that statutory authority
to regulate conduct implicitly authorized the Executive to regulate speech"). See
also id. at 1789 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
s' Id. at 1780 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S.

740, 750 (1961)).
'In addition, these Justices beaeved the regulations violated the Fifth
Amendment. Under the HHS regulations, a woman is no longer free from
government interference in her decision of whether to carry her pregnancy to term.
Id. at 1784 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

IId. at 1780 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
ss Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1781. As an example of compelled anti-abortion advocacy,

the dissent quoted HHS regulations:
Title X projects are required to facilitate access to prenatal care
and social services, including adoption services, that might be
needed by the pregnant client to promote her well-being and

that of her child, while making it abundantly clear that the
project is not permitted to promote abortion by facilitating access
to abortion through the referral process.
53 Fed. Reg. 2927 (1988) (emphasis added).
s ' Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1782 (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,715 (1977)).
60 Id. at 1782 n.3.
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project runs contrary to settled precedent. In Abood v. Detroit Board
of Education,61 for example, compelled speech via required union
membership as a condition of public employment was ruled an
unconstitutional condition, despite the ability to speak freely outside
of the workplace.62
In addition, the Court's previous unconstitutional conditions
cases require balancing of the speaker's interest in speaking and the
government's interest in restricting the speech.' In Rust, the Title
X clinic's interest in providing a pregnant woman with all available
information, including information about abortion, far outweighs the
government's articulated interest in ensuring federal funds are not
spent for abortions." The government would need a much more
compelling reason more narrowly tailored to justify "the suppression
of truthful information and medical opinion concerning
constitutionally protected conduct."'
While Rust clearly will have a devastating impact on women
served by Title X clinics, its implications may extend far beyond into
previously protected activities. After Rust, the government may
attempt to argue that it can restrict the speech of any organization
that receives public funds as a condition of the receipt of funding.
For example, the federal government could seek to censor museum
displays that receive National Endowment for the Arts funding for
"decency" or other content as a condition of funding." States or
cities could try to prohibit publicly-funded libraries from having
politically unpopular or controversial topics or authors in their
collections. Even universities, despite the majority's claim that free
speech on campuses is critical to our society,67 may face attempted
government restrictions on speech after the Rust decision. First
61431 U.S. 209
62

(1977).

Id. at 234.

Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1783 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
"Id.
Id. The dissent suggested that a more narrowly tailored regulation would be
one requiring rigorous bookkeeping to ensure financial separation of the abortion
portion and Title X part of the clinics or allowing a balanced distribution of familyplanning and health information. Id. at 1784.
"See, e.g., Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, No. CV 90-5236 AWT
(C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 27, 1990) (complaint by artists claiming that the National
Endowment for the Arts denied grants for content-based reasons unrelated to
artistic merit).
67 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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Amendment advocates already have made strong arguments seeking
to distinguish Rust from such situations. If these arguments fail,
however, the effect would be that the government would have
"produce[d] a result which [it] could not [have] command[ed]
directly'0 - content-based censorship of speech directly contrary
to decades of First Amendment precedent.
In response to the Rust decision, the House of Representatives
and the Senate both passed appropriations bills that effectively
repealed the "gag rule" regulation for one year." Both houses,
furthermore, have bills pending that would overturn the regulations
permanently.7 President Bush has vowed to veto this legislation.'
Regardless of legislative action, however, Rust will remain as a
disturbing precedent for future First Amendment jurisprudence.
B. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.
The Supreme Court upheld another content-specific
restriction in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.'
In that case, two
establishments providing live adult entertainment sued to prevent
the city of South Bend, Indiana, from applying Indiana's public.
indecency statute to prohibit live non-obscene nude dancing.' The
Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, viewed the statute as an improper
infringement of expressive activity because the statute was utilized
to prevent the dancers' messages of sexuality and eroticism. 74
By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court reversed the
Seventh Circuit and upheld Indiana's application of its public
indecency law to nude dancing.'m No single rationale was adopted
by the majority, which issued three separate opinions. A threejustice plurality, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, began its analysis by
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
Helen Dewar, Senate and House Unite to Overturn Ban on Clinics' Abortion
Counseling, WASH. POST, July 18, 1991, at A7. The House vote for the entire
appropriations bill, which contained the provision to not enforce the regulation,
was 353 to 74 and the Senate bill passed by a roll-call vote. Id.
70Id.
71 Id.
72 I
'

S. Ct. 2456 (1991).

Id. at 2459.

7'Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc),
rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
' Barnes, 111 S.Ct. at 2460.
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recognizing that nude dancing is "expressive conduct within the
outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though ... marginally
so.0

6

The statute at issue, however, did not ban this expressive

conduct as such, but instead forbade all public nudity.'
The
plurality thus agreed that the appropriate inquiry followed the test
set out in United States v. O'Brien for rules governing conduct
which have a restrictive effect on speech. 9 According to the
plurality, the state met the requirement that it have an "important or
substantial governmental interest" relating to the public indecency
statute due to its interest in public order and morality.' Quoting
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton8' and Bowers v. Hardwick,82 the
plurality stated that public order and morality were legitimate
governmental objectives.' Chief Justice Rehnquist then declared
that the Indiana statute "furthers a substantial government interest
in protecting order and morality," but without any discussion of how
76

Id.

77Id. at 2462.
78 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
" Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460. Under the O'Brien test, such a rule or statute is
constitutional when the following conditions are met.
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77.
The plurality found the first part of the test met as "clearly within the
constitutional power of the State .... " Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461 (Rehnquist, J.,
plurality).
' Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461 (Rehnquist, J., plurality). Indiana does not record
legislative history, but the plurality found the purpose of the statute in its text and
history. Forty-seven states have similar statutes. Public nudity was criminalized
at common law for hundreds of years. Indiana had a public indecency statute as
early as 1831 and the state supreme court in 1877 sustained a conviction for public
nudity by tracing the offense to the Biblical story of Adam and Eve, see Genesis 2:2
(King James). The current statute, passed in 1976, replaced a statute dating to 1881.
Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461-62.
8'413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973) (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
478 U.S. 186, 1% (1986) (upholding law criminalizing sodomy on basis of
public morality justification).
8 Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2462 (Rehnquist, J., plurality).
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it did so."
Addressing what has become the most important part of the
O'Brien test, the plurality said that the state's interest in protecting
public morality was not related to the suppression of free
expression.' The state was seeking to combat public nudity, the
plurality claimed, not the erotic messages that nude dancing
portrays.' The plurality noted that other erotic performances are
permitted without regulation, so long as the performers are wearing
the required clothing.' Compelling the performers to wear "pasties
and a G-string does not deprive the dance of whatever erotic
message it conveys; it simply makes the message slightly less
89
graphic."1

The O'Brien test lastly requires that the restriction on
expression be no greater than necessary to further the state's
interests." The plurality stated that the requirement that dancers
wear pasties and a G-string was the most narrow way to meet the
governmental interest in banning nudity in public places.9'
Implicitly rejecting an attack that the regulation is directed at
something other than public nudity, the plurality concluded that
"[t]he statutory provision is not a means to some greater end, but an
Id. After thoroughly discussing the history of public indecency statutes, the
plurality declared in one short conclusory sentence that the Indiana law could be
upheld on grounds of public morality. While pigeon-holing nude dancing into a
public morality justification may seem self-evident, the Court's justification in fact
was questionable in Barnes. The government made no attempt to prosecute under
Indiana's statutory prohibition of obscene performances. See IND. CODE ANN. § 3549-3-2 (West 1986). If the material is admittedly not obscene, its "immoral"
characterization is hardly self-evident. Without articulating any criteria for
prohibitions based on "public morality," the plurality has confused further what
type of conduct may be prohibited based on such a rationale. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at
2462 (Rehnquist, J., plurality).
' See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 n.8
(1984).
" Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2462 (Rehnquist, J., plurality).
87Id. at 2463.

Id.
Id. Illustrating the state's alleged purpose in regulating nudity without
regard to content, the plurality wrote that nudity at a public beach sends little, if
any, message, but the state still seeks to prohibit it. Id.
90 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.

9'Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2463.
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end in itself."'
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, took a more
extreme position than the plurality. He suggested that a law of
general application not aimed at suppressing expression is not
subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all.s" Almost every law
regulates conduct and nearly any prohibited conduct can be viewed
as expressive." First Amendment protection, according to Scalia,
thus extends only to laws aimed at suppressing expression" or
general laws applied only to suppress expression. 9
The extent to which a general law interferes with First
Amendment rights would be irrelevant under Scalia's analysis. If the
law is not aimed at expressive conduct, the First Amendment inquiry
ends, regardless of how much speech is suppressed.' To support
this novel theory, Justice Scalia cited his opinion in Employment
Division v. Smith," which held that laws of general applicability do
not receive First Amendment scrutiny under many circumstances
regardless of their harmful impact on the free exercise of religion.99
As in Smith, Justice Scalia suggested that the state needed only a
rational basis to justify its conduct in Barnes, not even the "important
or substantial" interest required of general laws regulating conduct
by the O'Brien test."° Moral opposition to public nudity is a
9Id.

Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 2466. Justice Scalia cited as an example Florida Free Beaches, Inc. v.
Miami, 734 F.2d 608, 609 (5th Cir. 1984) (public indecency law challenged by nude
sunbathers who claimed the "message" they were expressing was that nudity is not
indecent). Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2466 (Scalia, J., concurring).
"Id. An example of this kind of law was the flag-desecration statutes struck
down in United States v. Eichmann, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990), and Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989). The government in these cases tried to suppress conduct
because of its communicative impact.
" Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2464 (Scalia, J., concurring). For example, Justice Scalia
suggested that if Indiana had only prosecuted nude dancing, but had not targeted
"nude beaches and unclothed purveyors of hot dogs and machine tools," a First
Amendment problem would arise. Indiana, however, has prosecuted noncommunicative nude activities. Id.
17

Id.

96110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990)
9 Id. at 1603. See Elliot Mincberg, The Supreme Court and the First Amendment:
The 1989-90 Term, 8 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 2 (1990).
" Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2466-67 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). See also Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1602.
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rational basis for the law, so it automatically passes constitutional
muster according to Scalia."1
It is important to note that not one other Justice joined in
Justice Scalia's opinion, which would represent a radical rewriting of
the First Amendment. In Smith, as commentators have observed,"°
Scalia's opinion effectively eliminated First Amendment protection
for many religious practices threatened by generally applicable laws
not aimed explicitly at religion." Scalia's opinion in Barnes would
have a similar effect on the Freedom of Speech Clause.l" Virtually
any expression could be suppressed so long as the explicit
governmental purpose was not to silence expression, contrary to
O'Brien and decades of Supreme Court precedent."°
Justice Souter, in one of only two written concurrences of his
first term, took a more moderate view as the fifth vote for the
majority."l Justice Souter agreed with the plurality that nude
dancing sends an erotic message and, therefore, is due some degree
of First Amendment protection.1 0 7 He also concurred that O'Brien
was the proper methodology to apply."M He differed from the
plurality, however, by viewing the state's interest not as promoting
morality, but as preventing the secondary effects associated with
these establishments. 1" These secondary effects, moreover, need
10 Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2467-68.

1 See, e.g., Mincberg, supra note 99, at 8.
Id. at 4.
"' Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2463.

103

1 See United States v. O'Brien, 397 U.S. 367 (1967) and cases cited therein.
'

Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2468 (Souter, J., concurring).
o7 Id.

108 Id.
0

Id. at 2469 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 37).

Justice Souter, like the

plurality, acknowledged that Indiana does not record legislative history, so the
purpose of the statute must be inferred. Justice Souter relied on the state's
arguments to the Court, where it argued that nude dancing "encourag[es]
prostitution, increas[es] sexual assaults, and attract[s] other criminal activity." Id.
(quoting Brief for Petitioners at 37). Justice Souter suggested that the actual
purpose which motivated the legislature is irrelevant; instead, the Court should
look to "the existence or not of a current governmental interest in the service of
which the challenged application of the statute may be constitutional." Id. While
this approach, unlike that of Justice Scalia, examines the importance of the
governmental interests which have the effect of infringing free speech, such
deference to purposes that the legislature may not have even considered more
closely resembles review of legislation touching garden-variety rights such as
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only be correlated to the presence of nude dancing facilities
regardless of whether a causal relation is shown." ° Based on this
standard, Justice Souter also voted to uphold the application of the
Indiana statute to nude barroom-style dancing."'
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined in a
dissenting opinion by Justice White in Barnes."' The dissent
argued that the O'Brien test should not be applied here because the
statute was not of general applicability."' The statute does not
apply to nudity in the home, to nudity as some larger form of
expression, or to nudity in a theatrical production." 4 The Court,
therefore, should have closely inquired as to the true purpose of the
statute." s
The dissent explained that the reason for this law appeared
to be to prevent people from appearing nude in public where others
may be offended." 6 The law, thus, does not properly apply to
nude dancing establishments which only admit consenting
adults." 7 The state has applied it to nude dancing "to protect the
viewers from what the state believes is the harmful message that
nude dancing communicates."" ' This application is thus aimed at
the communicative aspects of the conduct.
The dissent amplified this point by explaining that nudity
economic legislation, not statutes affecting explicit provisions of the Constitution.
.10
Id. The effect of Justice Souter's highly deferential methodology, while
apparently intended to be more limited than the plurality, has disturbing impli-

cations. Since the governmental interest may be created after the legislation has
been passed and since a mere correlation between the establishments and the evils
attacked will suffice, the state could effectively regulate some forms of expressive
conduct by applying a general statute to expressive activity, creating a justification
for it, and then finding some ancillary effect somehow related to the conduct. This,
in effect, would allow conduct to be regulated, just as Justice Scalia's theory would,
so long as the express purpose of the statute is not to regulate expression.
11 Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2468.

Id. at 2471.

112
11

Barnes, 111 S.Ct. at 2472 (White, J., dissenting).

114
Id.

at 2473. The dissent noted that the statute at issue in O'Brien was of

general applicability. It forbade the burning of a draft card even in one's own
home. Since the Indiana law does not forbid nudity in the home or other places,
it is not a general law. Id.
115Id.
116Id.
117 Id.

118 Id.
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was more than just incidental conduct, but was "an expressive
component of the dance. 1 19 The state was interested in prohibiting
this expression because it evoked erotic and sensual feelings and
emotions in those who viewed it."' Because the government
sought to regulate the content of the expression, the statute should
be subject to "the most exacting scrutiny"'' and should be upheld
only if "narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental
interest."2
Under this standard, the dissent explained, the court of
appeals decision striking down the statute as applied should be
affirmed. None of the Justices in the plurality claimed that the
statute served a compelling state interest, but merely that the
interests were important and substantial. 3
The statute,
furthermore, was not narrowly tailored to meet the state's interests
articulated by the plurality or by Justice Souter. The state could have
adopted measures that would not have interfered with expressive
nude dancing, such as requiring performers and patrons to remain
a certain distance from each other, limiting nude dancing to certain
hours, dispersing such establishments throughout the city, or
criminalizing prostitution and obscene behavior. 24 Eliminating an
entire class of expressive conduct, however, does not pass exacting
scrutiny.12

The legacy of Barnes may well extend beyond nude dancing
in First Amendment jurisprudence. The new standard set out in
Barnes effectively could allow evasion of the obscenity standard in
Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2473.
m Id. at 2474.
n Id. (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,412 (1989) (quoting Boos v. Barry,

"1

435 U.S. 312, 321 (1980))).
" Id. (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983)).
13 Id. at 2474 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted that Justice Souter's
admission that there was no causal connection between the expressive conduct and
the secondary effects the state sought to regulate leaves the statute without even
a rational basis to prohibit an entire class of admittedly expressive activity. Id. at

2474 n.2.
14 Id. at 2475.
'u Id. The dissent also attacked Justice Scalia's rationale because the law was
not of a general character. Since the law is content-specific, the rationale for Justice
Scalia's opinion is non-existent. Id.

18
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Miller v. California."s Since all of the justices agreed that nude
dancing is expressive conduct and since this conduct was admittedly
non-obscene, the Miller test should have been applied and the
expression should have been protected by the First Amendment.
Barnes, however, allows admittedly non-obscene material to be
regulated by public indecency statutes.127 Indiana, which chose not
to prosecute these establishments under the state obscene
performances statute, still can prohibit this activity without
constitutional impediment because of its interest in promoting
"public morality."
The implication, therefore, is that a state may seek to prohibit
a wide range of expression which conflicts with the majority's notion
of public morality through a public indecency law. Although Barnes
itself applies only to total nudity, the plurality's rationale could be
extended further. A state could seek to use a public indecency law
to ban scantily-clad ethnic dances such as belly dancers in Moroccan
restaurants or nude dancers in Les Ballets Africains de Keita Fodeba. A
slightly different statute could be used to attempt to ban nudity in
film. Despite Judge Posner's admonition in the court below that "it
would violate the First Amendment to require museums to place fig
leaves and brassieres on their paintings and statues,"'" the Barnes
plurality's opinion could call this into question as well. A Court
willing to defer to majoritarian views on public indecency may also
be willing to revisit settled doctrine in other areas, threatening First
Amendment freedoms.' 9
" 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Under the Miller test, sexually-oriented expression may
be prohibited only if the state can prove that "'the average person applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest," that "the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law," and that "the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
Id. at 24.
" Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2462.
" Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1102 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Posner, J., concurring), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2456

(1991).

" While artistic forms of expression may be the most likely to be endangered
by Barnes,other unpopular expression may be threatened. The flag-burning cases,
for example, represent protection of views the majority finds morally repugnant.
See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Writing CirclesAround the FirstAmendment, LEGAL TIMES, July
22, 1991, at S28. It should be noted, however, that Justice Souter did not accept the
"public morality" rationale in Barnes, and instead sought to distinguish the
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C. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada
The Supreme Court upheld yet another content-specific
restriction in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada."
There, a defense
attorney was sanctioned by the state bar for making comments to the
media that, according to a bar disciplinary board, he knew or should
have known could have prejudiced the jury. In a highly publicized
case, Gentile's client was indicted for stealing drugs and money
being used in a police undercover operation."
Hours after the
indictment was delivered, Gentile held a press conference to counter
negative publicity already surrounding the case. 32
Gentile
specifically said that his client was innocent and that the evidence at
trial would show that the actual criminals were the police." Six
months later, a jury, which apparently was not affected by Gentile's
statements,TM acquitted the defendant on all counts."
The State Bar of Nevada filed a complaint against Gentile for
violating Nevada Supreme Court Rule 1 7 7 ," which is almost
identical to ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6.1
In
pertinent part, Rule 177(1) prohibits an attorney from making an
extrajudicial statement to the press "if the attorney knows or
reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of
barroom-style dancing at issue in that case from nudity in other forms of artistic
expression, suggesting that a majority of the Court may not accept a broad reading
of the Barnes decision.
130
111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
131Id. at 2727.
1- Id. at 2722, 2728.
133

'

Id. at 2724.

Id. at 2730. At voir dire, many of the jurors indicated that they remembered

general publicity about the nature of the crime and one juror recalled that reports
said the police were cleared of suspicion. None of the empaneled jurors, however,
said they had any recollection of the Gentile news conference. Id.

" Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2723 (1991).
Sup. Cr. RULES, Rule 177, subs.1, 3 (1986) [hereinafter Rule 177]. The

13NEV.

entire rule is set out in Appendix B of Justice Kennedy's opinion. Gentile, 111 S.Ct.

at 2737.
137MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1981). Rule 3.6 prohibits
a lawyer from making an extrajudicial statement that a lawyer knows or reasonably

should know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an
adjudicative proceeding.
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A
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.""
Disciplinary Board found Gentile violated Rule 177 and the Nevada
Supreme Court affirmed.'
A five-justice majority found that Rule 177 was not an
unconstitutional restriction upon Gentile's speech and rejected his
claim that the state must show a clear and present danger of actual
prejudice to sanction his speech.1"0 But a different five-justice
majority reversed the Nevada Court's imposition of sanctions upon
Gentile. 41 The first majority explained that attorneys, as officers of
the court, are subject to a balancing test, "weighing the State's
interest in the regulation of a specialized profession against a
lawyer's First Amendment interest in the kind of speech that was at
issue.",
The majority found that the "substantial likelihood" test set
out in Rule 177 adequately balances these two concerns."
According to the majority, the Rule successfully combats the two
evils it was designed to prevent: statements likely to affect the actual
outcome of a trial and remarks likely to influence the jury pool, even
if an untainted jury eventually is empaneled.'" The Court also
found that the test imposes only limited restrictions on an attorney's
The regulations merely apply to speech that has a
speech."
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the jury, the Rule
applies to all attorneys in a pending case, and it simply delays an
attorney's statements until the trial is completed. 1 The majority
thus found Rule 177's restrictions to be narrowly tailored to meet a
13'
Gentile,

111 S. Ct. at 2722. Rule 177(2) lists several specific types of

statements that may cause material prejudice, while Rule 177(3) affords a safe

harbor by listing a number of statements that can be made "notwithstanding" the
other parts of the Rule. Id.
139Id.
'4

"

111 S. Ct. at 2745-48 (Rehnquist, J., majority parts I, I).
Id. at 2736 (Kennedy, J., majority part III, VI).

Id. at 2744.

142

143Id.
I4

at 2745.
Id. The Court noted that other remedies such as voir dire or change in venue

may not adequately prevent the process from infection by pretrial publicity, and

even if they do, these measures can create serious costs to the criminal justice system. Id.
145 Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2745.
14 Id.
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substantial governmental interest.147
Justice Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion that Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. His dissent stated that the
Rule was a content-specific restriction aimed at core political speech
that lies at the heart of the First Amendment."4
Kennedy
postulated that the drafters of the ABA Model Rule 3.6, upon which
Rule 177 was based, formulated the "substantial likelihood" criteria
to be the equivalent of a clear and present danger test consistent with
other restrictions on core political speech.'49 At the very least,
therefore, the Nevada regulation must measure "the imminence and
magnitude of the danger said to flow from the particular utterance
and then . . . balance the character of the evil, as well as its

likelihood, against the need for free and unfettered expression."'
Kennedy went on to argue that-both the test he favored and
the less stringent test the majority upheld should have resulted in a
finding that Gentile's speech did not present a substantial likelihood
of prejudice.'51 No prejudice in fact was caused since no juror
remembered Gentile's press conference. 52
In addition, the
likelihood of prejudice was minimal since the press conference was
six months before trial, the jury pool from which the eventual panel
would be chosen was large, and only the most damaging of
statements would give rise to prejudice."s Gentile's motivation for
calling the press conference, furthermore, was not to prejudice
potential jurors, but to counter already prejudicial publicity
emanating from the police and prosecution.TM Because no actual
prejudice arose or none was likely to arise from Gentile's comments
and because the speech involved was at the core of the First
Amendment, Kennedy contended that the Rule, as construed 1by the
Nevada Supreme Court, should be deemed unconstitutional. 5
Despite the majority's finding that the Rule was
constitutional, Justice O'Connor abandoned the Chief Justice and
147 Id.
148 Id.
149

Id. at 2728.

1m

Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2725 (quoting Landmark Communications, Inc. v.

Virginia, 435 U. S. 829, 842-43 (1979)).
151

Id. at 2726.

Id. at 2731.
153 Id. at 2730.
..Id. at 2729.
1 Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2726.
152
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joined Justice Kennedy's opinion that the Rule's "safe harbor
provision" did not give Gentile sufficient notice that his statements
were not permitted and that the sanctions against Gentile should be
reversed."s The safe harbor provision, "notwithstanding" Rules
177(1) and (2), allows an attorney to "state without elaboration...
the general nature of the ...

defense."1" 7 The fact that Gentile was

found in violation of the Rule despite research into the scope of the
rule and conscious efforts at compliance led to the holding that the
rule was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him."s
The
decision upholding Rule 177 is disconcerting because, as the dissent
noted, it applied a lenient standard to allow a content-specific
restriction on core political speech. Some restrictions on an
attorney's speech are certainly appropriate. An attorney who holds
a press conference on the eve of jury selection or releases confidential
discovery information, for example, may pose a clear and present
danger of prejudicing a jury. As construed by Nevada, however,
Rule 177 waters this standard down so that any attorneys making an
extra-judicial statement in a jury trial may put themselves at risk.
Dissemination of information about issues at the heart of the First
Amendment should not be so easily suppressed.
The Court also failed to address a basic fairness concern in its
decision. Prosecutors are free to hold a press conference and read
every word of the indictment because it is "information contained in
a public record."'5 9 Prosecutors, furthermore, often elaborate on the
charges in the indictment during these press conferences."W By not
's

Id. at 2748-49.

's

Rule 177(3).

Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2732 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). The night before the press
conference, Gentile and two associates spent several hours researching an attorney's
's

obligations under Rule 177. Id. at 2729. At the press conference, Gentile refused
to answer several questions because he felt that "ethics prohibit[ed him] from doing
so." Id. at 2731 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Appellant's Petition for Certiorari at

11a).
19 NEV. Sup. Cr. RuLEs, Rule 177(3)(b).
"0 Prosecutors often release an indictment at a press conference and then
further comment on the situation. After a prominent business leader was arrested
in Los Angeles for drug possession, for example, the Los Angeles Times reported the
following:
Immediately after the arraignment, prosecutors called a press
conference to release the indictment .... U.S. Attorney William

Braniff said the case illustrates the growing role people with
power and status in the financial community are playing in the
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allowing the defense a chance to counter this negative press, the
decision may produce just the opposite of what the majority claimed
it was preserving: an unbiased jury pool. This is especially true if
jurors need not be questioned about such prosecution statements at
voir dire," and if the defense cannot respond through the media.
The Court seems not only to have lessened the First Amendment
standard to be applied to this kind of speech, but to have tipped the
scales in favor of the prosecution.
D. Renne v. Geary
The final free speech case during this term was Renne v.
Renne involved a provision of the California Constitution
that prohibited political parties and party central committees from
endorsing candidates for nonpartisan offices."6' Ten registered
voters, including members of both the Democratic and Republican
County Central Committees, brought suit to prevent the City and
County governments from continuing to delete party endorsements
in voter pamphlets, which the government prints and mails to
prospective voters.'" The lower court had upheld the provision.
A six-person majority dismissed the case as nonjusticiable.'"
Never reaching the merits, the majority dismissed the case because
the respondents did not present a live dispute involving actual or
threatened application of the constitutional provision to prohibit
particular speech and did not show that the provision would be
Geary.62

world of narcotics trafficking. "Ibelieve the indictment points
out the potential danger that exists when members of society
with influence in financial affairs offer, their services, in this case
to the underworld, for any illicit purposes they want," Braniff

said.
Jennifer Warren, Grand Jury Indicts Silberman in Laundering Case, L.A. TIMEs, April
22, 1989, § 2, at 1.Even the Attorney General of the United States has made such
statements. After Eastern Airlines was indicted for failing to maintain proper
safety records, Attorney General Richard Thornburg released a statement in which
he said this alleged conspiracy "strikes a raw nerve in anyone who has ever
boarded an airplane." Pete Bowles & Tom Incantalupo, Eastern 9 Officials Indicted,
Feds Charge Passengers 'At Risk, NEWSDAY, July 26, 1990, at 3.
161See Mu'Min

v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991).

16

111 S. Ct. 2331 (1991).

1

CAL. CONST. art. II,§ 6(b).

'"Renne, 111 S. Ct. at 2335.
165Id.
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enforced except against actual candidates in the context of voter
pamphlets.'"
Justice White, in dissent, would have examined the merits
and found the provision to be constitutional.167 Since Supreme
Court precedent has allowed other restrictions on partisan politics,
including omitting party designations from the ballot, White
suggested that excluding party designations from governmentprepared voter pamphlets is constitutional.1" Because the voter
information pamphlet is not a traditional public forum, White wrote,
its use can be restricted to its intended purpose, which is to provide
information about nonpartisan elections. 69
Justices Marshall and Blackmun also dissented and would
have considered the~merits, but would have found the provision to
be unconstitutional."
These Justices criticized the majority for
cavalierly ignoring applicable precedent concerning justiciability."
In particular, the dissent contended the respondents had standing to
bring the suit because of their status as potential "listeners" of the
message at issue."7 The dissent also explained that the record
revealed a likelihood that the political parties would violate the
provision in the future and that the government would continue to
redact the references to party endorsements, further supporting
standing to sue."r On the merits, Marshall and Blackmun would
have struck down the constitutional provision because it interfered
'"Id.at 2338-39.
167 Id. at 2342 (White, J., dissenting).
1'6Id. at 2345.
'"Renne, 111 S. Ct. at 2345 (White, J., dissenting).
'oId. at 2346 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
i7Id. According to the dissent, the precedent most on point is Eu v. San
Francisco Democratic Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214 (1989). Renne, 111 S. Ct. at
2349-50. The Eu Court struck down a similar California law that prohibited party
endorsements in primary elections for partisan offices. Eu, 489 U.S. at 222-29.
in2 Renne, 111 S.Ct. at 2347 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Virginia Pharmacy
Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976)).
"'[Listeners' suffer a cognizable First Amendment injury when the State restricts
speech for which they were the intended audience." Id. The dissent contended that
the injury suffered here clearly is traceable to the policy of removing the
endorsements from the pamphlets because the listeners are deprived of this
information. Id.
173 Id. at 2349. As the dissent explained, the exact identity of the candidates to
be endorsed, the type of publicity to be used, or the precise language to be used
should not be relevant to determine the ripeness or standing issue. Id.
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with core political speech. 74 The state's justification that it sought
to prevent local judges and government from being controlled by
political parties rather than by the people falls far short of the
required compelling governmental interest; instead, the dissent
suggested, it is a paternalistic view that the "the people" must be
protected from a perceived susceptibility to influence from political
speech."7 Justices Marshall and Blackmun explained that "the
prospect that voters might be persuaded by party endorsements is
political process; it is the
not a corruption of the democratic
76
democratic political process.'
II. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION:
LEHNERT V. FERRIS FACULTY ASSOCIATION
The sole freedom of association case during the past term was
The case concerned a
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association."
teachers' union, the Ferris Faculty Association (FFA), that sought to
charge objecting nonunion employees for various union activities.
FFA, pursuant to statutory authority, served as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative for the faculty of Ferris State
Ferris suggested and FFA accepted an
College in Michigan."
agency-shop agreement whereby all employees who did not belong
to FFA would pay a service fee equal to the dues of union
members.'" Objecting nonunion employees brought suit to stop
being charged for union activities not related to its role as collective
bargainer. The district court and court of appeals held that certain
of the union expenditures were constitutionally chargeable to
petitioners, concluding that each of the activities in question was
sufficiently related to the union duties as petitioners' exclusive
collective bargaining representative to justify compelling petitioners
74Id. at 2352.
175Renne, 111 S. Ct. at 2352-53 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
176 Id. at 2353 (emphasis in original). The dissent also acknowledged that the

state may choose to free these officials from political control by making the
positions appointed rather than elected. "But the greater power to dispense with
elections altogether does not include the lesser power to conduct elections under
conditions of state-imposed voter ignorance." If elections are held, all parties must
be accorded their full First Amendment rights. Id.

17 111 S.Ct. 1950 (1991).
'n Id. at 1955.
179Id.
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to assist in subsidizing it."8
A fragmented Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed
in part, holding that some of the union activities at issue may
constitutionally be supported through objecting employees' funds,
while others may not.' 81 Though there were several separate
opinions, five votes supported the principal opinion written by
Justice Blackmun. 82 A majority of the Court agreed that a state
may not constitutionally compel its employees to subsidize legislative
lobbying or other political union activities not related to performing
contract ratification or other functions under the collective bargaining
agreement.183 Justice Blackmun explained that while requiring
contributions of non-union employees to related activities is justified
by the government's interest in promoting labor peace and avoiding
the "free-rider" problem that would otherwise accompany union
recognition, neither goal is served by charging objecting employees
for lobbying, electoral, and other political activities.184
Justice Blackmun also wrote that compelled speech dealing
with lobbying and electorial activities is a clear burden upon freedom
of expression."s When dissenters' fees are used for such purposes,
such dissenters are in essence being used as "an instrument for
fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view [they] find
unacceptable."'" Although most of the Court was in agreement
that these principles should be applied in Lehnert, the Court was
divided on which expenditures should be chargeable to
dissenters. 87
The majority found that local bargaining
representatives may charge objecting employees for their pro rata
share of the costs associated with otherwise chargeable activities of
its state and national affiliates, even if those activities were not
performed for the direct benefit of the objecting employees'
18Id. at 1954.
18 Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1954.
182
183

Id.
Id. at 1960-61.

" Id. at 1960. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, (1977)
(upholding the constitutionality of the Michigan agency-shop provision and
outlining permissible uses of the compelled fee by public-employee unions).
's Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1960.
186Id. (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (holding that the
right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action
includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking)).
187Id. at 1967.

1991]

FIRST AMENDMENT

bargaining unit.'
In reaching this conclusion, the Court utilized
the set of guidelines established by Railway Employees v. Hanson'89
and Machinists v. Street"9t "that chargeable activities must (1) be
'germane' to collective-bargaining activity; (2) be justified by the
government's vital policy interest in labor peace and avoiding 'free
riders'; and (3) not significantly add to the burdening of free speech
that is inherent in the allowance of an agency or union shop."' 91
The Court concluded that a direct relationship between the expenses
at issue and some tangible benefit to the dissenters' bargaining unit
is not necessary."9 Instead, the Court required only that "there
must be some indication that the payment is for services that may
ultimately enure to the benefit of the local union by virtue of their
membership in the parent organization.""
Justice Scalia, however, disagreed with this conclusion."M
He would hold that "contributions can be compelled only for the
costs of performing the union's statutory duties as exclusive
bargaining agents."'9
The majority expressly rejected this test,
noting that it would turn "our constitutional doctrine on its head.
Instead of interpreting statutes in light of First Amendment
principles, he would interpret the First Amendment in light of state
statutory law.' 9
The majority in Lehnert affirmed'the court of appeals decision
that the use of compulsory dues was constitutionally permissible to

'

Id. at 1961.

351 U.S. 225 (1956). In Hanson, the Court recognized the validity of a "union
shop" agreement authorized by the Railway Labor Act despite constitutionally
based objections.
190 367 U.S. 740 (1961). The Street Court construed the Railway Labor Act to
deny unions the authority to expend dissenters' funds in support of political causes
to which those employees objected.
191Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1959.
'9 Id. at 1961.

'" Id. The union surely may not, for example, charge objecting employees for
a direct donation or interest-free loan to an unrelated bargaining unit for the
purpose of promoting employee rights or unionism generally. Id. And as always,
the union bears the burden of proving the proportion of chargeable expenses to
total expenses. Id. at 1962. See Chicago Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 306
(1986); Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 239-40, n. 40 (1977);
Railway Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122 (1963).
" Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1975 (Scalia, J., plurality).
195 Id.
196

Id. at 1963.

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Vol. IX

support expenditures by the national union for programs in other
states and the expenses the state union's publication listed as relating
to collective bargaining." The majority found that as long as the
costs are germane to collective bargaining and similar support
services, no greater relationship is necessary.'" The Court also
found this rationale applicable to expenses for participation by the
faculty union delegates in state and national union conventions and
coordinating meetings with other faculty unions. 199 The majority
also affirmed the lower court decision that requiring payment for the
state union's publication of information that concerned teaching and
education generally, professional development, unemployment, job
opportunities and award programs was constitutionally
permissible."
The Court found that these programs were not
political in nature and thus no burden on the First Amendment. 2"
Finally, the Court affirmed the court of appeals decision that costs of
preparation for an illegal strike were expenditures that were
chargeable to dissenting members.'
Blackmun accepted the
rationale that such expenditures fall "within the range of reasonable
bargaining tools available to a public sector union during contract
negotiations."'
The majority opinion reversed the court of appeals, however,
as to three categories of expenditures where the use of compulsory
dues was found constitutionally impermissible.' Justice Blackmun
found that compulsory dues used to support litigation that did not
concern the bargaining unit and the cost of union publication
reporting these activities was not permissible. Blackmun explained
that extra-unit litigation was similar to lobbying and should be
treated as such.'
And because it covers a diverse range of areas,
there are situations when certain litigation is not related to an
197Id.

198Id.
1WId. at 1964-65.

o Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1964.
2M

Id.

a Id. at 1965.
a Id. (quoting Lehnert, 881 F. 2d 1388, 1394 (6th Cir. 1989)).
2

id. at 1963-64.

' Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1963. The Supreme Court has long recognized the
important political and expressive nature of litigation. Id. See, e.g., NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963) (recognizing that for certain groups, "association for
litigation may be the most effective form of political association").
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objecting employee's unit, and thus not germane to the union's
duties as exclusive bargaining representative.'
Justice Marshall, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
disagreed with Justice Blackmun on this issue.'
Marshall
suggested that the majority abandoned the tests established by
Hanson and Street that the expenses, be germane to a union's
collective-bargaining responsibilities when dealing with lobbying
costs.'
He contended that Blackmun erred in creating a very
narrow rule for testing the constitutional acceptability of charges for
lobbying or litigation activities.'
Marshall maintained that the
requirement that a chargeable activity relate to "ratification or
implementation" of a collective-bargaining agreement departs
dramatically from the Court's prior decisions, and that the standard
has always and should continue to refer uniformly to negotiation and
administration as the touchstones for determining chargeability.21 °
The majority also found that a union program designed to
secure funds for public relations expenditures used to enhance the
reputation of the teaching profession was constitutionally
impermissible."
The Court concluded that the program to secure
funds was similar to lobbying and electoral politics and thus cannot
be supported through funds of objecting employees absent showing
that activities were oriented toward ratification or implementation of
a collective bargaining agreement.
The majority suggested that
these activities involved speech of a political nature in a public forum
similar to lobbying activities and would fall under the protection of
the First Amendment.213
Justice Marshall, in contrast, suggested that expenditures for
public relations should not be excluded from the fees of dissenting
members.21 Unlike the majority, Marshall did not see support of
public relations expenditures as a significant burden on the First
Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1963-64.
' Id. at 1967 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
2 id.

Id.
210Id. See e.g., M v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435,448 (1984); Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 221 (1977); Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 760
2

(1%1).
211Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1964.
212

Id.

1

Id. at 1971 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).

214

Id. at 1972.
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Amendment; he suggested that there is no difference, for First
Amendment purposes, between requiring dissenting employees to
support the union on certain issues in private collective-bargaining
negotiations and supporting the union on the same issues
publicly. 5
The issue of compulsory union dues and what expenditures
are chargeable to dissenting members is very complex. The general
principle utilized by the Court in Lehnert appears consistent with past
precedent and First Amendment principles, even though questions
may remain as to the details of its application. As the Court
recognized, "the right of freedom of thought protected by the First
Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all."216
III. THE COURT'S DECISIONS ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
The Supreme Court decided three cases this Term involving
freedom of the press. Consistent with its decisions concerning free
expression, the Court ruled against the press in all three cases.
A. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine
Two of the Court's decisions dealt with print media and the
question of what constitutes libel. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine"7
was a libel case in which a public figure claimed he was defamed by
a reporter who knowingly used quotation marks around comments
that he, in fact, had not made. "The First Amendment protects
authors and journalists who write about public figures by requiring
a plaintiff to prove that the defamatory statements were made with
actual malice, a term of art denoting deliberate or reckless
falsification."' "8 The issue in Masson was whether the requisite
falsity is present in the attribution of words to a public figure which
"' Id. After all, Marshall reasoned, union negotiators must argue either
implicitly or explicitly during a collective-bargaining session that the teachers they
represent are valuable public servants who deserve higher compensation or
benefits. Id.
216 Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1957 (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714
(1977).27

111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).

28 Id. at 2424.
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he did not actually speak.219
Masson concerned a highly critical article in the New Yorker
Magazine concerning Jeffrey Masson, former director of the Sigmund
Freud Archives, who was discharged after harshly criticizing
Masson sued the New Yorker and Janet
Freudian psychology.'
Malcolm, the author of the article, for libel, claiming that they had
damaged his reputation by falsely attributing to him, using quotation
marks, several damaging statements that he had not actually
made." The suit focused on six quotations; Masson claimed that
Malcolm fabricated all but one passage, and with respect to the sixth
passage, he claimed that she omitted a crucial portion, rendering the
remainder misleading.'m Although the tape recordings of the
interviews showed that Masson, in fact, had made statements
substantially identical to a number of the passages, no identical
statement appears in the more than 40 hours of taped interviews.'
Assuming that the quotations were not accurate, the trial court ruled
that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment against
Masson. The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that the alleged
inaccuracies were either substantially true or were "rational
interpretations" of ambiguous remarks, and thus did not raise a jury
question on the required actual malice. 4
The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the First
Amendment does not protect writers who deliberately fabricate
quotes that are materially different from what a speaker really
says.' The Court rejected the lower courts' view that an alleged
quotation receives First Amendment immunity if it226is a "rational
interpretation of a public figure's actual statements."
Seven members of the Court also found that every
misquotation does not necessarily carry with it the requisite degree
219

22
2M

Id.
Id. at 2425.
Id.
Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2425.

Id. Malcolm claimed to the district court that not all of her discussions with
petitioner were recorded on tape and that she had taken notes of several
conversations, which were later discarded. Id. at 2428.
' 4 Id. at 2429. The actual malice standard is defined as the author having
knowledge that the statement was false, or recklessly disregarding whether the
statement is false or not. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1963).
Masson, 111 S.Ct. at 2429.
Id. at 2433.
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of actual malice to sustain a cause of libel. 7 In dealing with the
question of falsity, Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court, the common
law of libel "overlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon
substantial truths."' Thus, as long as the substance of the alleged
libelous material can be proven true, every word does not have to be
justified. "If an author alters a speaker's words but effects no material
change in meaning, including any meaning conveyed by the manner
or fact of expression, the speaker suffers no injury to reputation that
is compensable as a defamation." 29 Based on this standard, the
Court ruled that five of the six quotations differed "materially" from
Masson's actual statements and thus raised "an issue of fact for the
jury as to falsity."'
Justices White and Scalia dissented in part, contending that
summary judgment was not warranted with respect to any of the six
quotations. 3' The dissent criticized the standard used by Justice
Kennedy, contending that the majority ignored the fact that under
New York Times v. Sullivan, 32 "reporting a known falsehood ...

is

According to the dissent, the issue
sufficient proof of malice."'
spoke the words attributed to
actually
was simply whether Masson
3
Malice, in regard to libel, is defined as a deliberate
him.'
falsehood or reckless disregard for whether the fact asserted is true
or false.' As Justice White suggested, this definition does not take
a
into consideration whether or not the misquotation results in Z36
material change in the meaning conveyed by the statement.
According to the dissent, the majority's standard improperly
' Id. at 2431. ("If every alteration constituted the falsity required to prove
actual malice, the practice of journalism... would require radical change.").
22' Id. at 2433.

Id. (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the case was remanded for
" Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2435-37.
further proceedings. Id. at 2437.
2" Id. at 2438.
212 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (requiring a plaintiff in a libel suit to prove actual malice
on the part of the defendant).
"' Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2438 (White, J., dissenting).

2UId.

Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
z" Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2438 (White, J., dissenting).
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' 7
suggested that "the reporter may lie a little, but not too much. Q3
With the adoption of the "material change" standard, the
Court has chosen a middle ground in libel actions between the
"rational interpretation" rule of the court of appeals and the known
falsehood standard of the dissent. The Court appears to have
borrowed its approach from a defense allowed under California state
law, "substantial truth," which the Court found to be a correct test
applied in Masson. Under the defense of substantial truth, Malcolm
may be absolved even if she could not justify every word of the
alleged defamatory matter as correct. The material would not be
considered false unless it would have a different effect on the mind
of the reader from that which an accurate statement would have
produced. "Minor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as
the substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge be
justified."'
To a point, the Court agreed with this interpretation and used
it as a basis for establishing the material change standard. 9
Readers of Malcolm's work may have found the work particularly
damaging because it appeared to be a self-portrait told in petitioner's
own words. And if the alteration of these words produced a
different meaning in the reader's mind than the actual truth, the
alteration may be actionable.2' The Supreme Court held that the
court of appeals went one step beyond protection of quotations that
convey the meaning of a speaker's statement with substantial
accuracy, however, in applying a "rational interpretation"

27 Id. Justice White also criticized the Court for overstepping its role in
deciding on summary judgment. According to the dissent, the majority measured
whether or not there was a substantial difference between the misquotation and
comments expressed by Masson from its own point of view. Id. This approach

"assigns to the courts issues that are for the jury to decide." Id. Only if, as a matter

of law, reasonable jurors could not conclude that attributing to Masson certain
words that he did not say "expose[d] [him] to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or
obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency
to injure him in his occupation," (CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 1982)) then summary
judgment would be justified. Id. The dissent claimed that this was all that was
necessary to determine that summary judgment was not warranted in Masson. Id.
at 3438 (White, J., dissenting).
2

Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2433 (quoting Heuer v. Kee, 59 P.2d 1063 (Cal. Ct. App.

1936)).
2
240

Id.

Id.
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standard.2"'
As the dissent pointed out, however, the majority's standard
effectively permits a reporter to falsely use quotation marks when a
paraphrase would do.2' Quotation marks around a passage add
credibility to the words, indicating that the passage represents the
speaker's exact language. Under such circumstances, the dissent
suggested, even a minor alteration of the words, or in the meaning
conveyed by the speaker, could result in damage to the speaker's
reputation.243
By speaking in terms of a material change in the meaning
conveyed, the majority may be unwittingly encouraging those
interviewed to second-guess the coverage they receive. For example,
a reporter may interview someone for two to three hours, but the
actual article may consists of only two paragraphs. The opinion in
Masson could allow such an interviewee to sue the reporter for libel
on the ground that although the article was literally accurate, it was
a deliberate and "material" distortion of what was meant. In this
respect, the opinion could actually provide less First Amendment
protection in the long term than a rule that provided a clear test of
falsity for quotations, such as one which drew the line at correction
of grammar or syntax. Nonetheless, the Court's opinion may
provide for better protection of the press against groundless suits by
interviewees with minor complaints than the standard suggested by
the dissent. The majority opinion gives journalists freedom not only
to correct grammar and syntax but also the "practical necessity to
edit and make intelligible a speaker's perhaps rambling
comments."'
B. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.
The decision in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.2' involved a
public figure who sued two Minnesota newspapers for violation of
a promise of confidentiality given to the source in exchange for
information.2 ' Cohen presented the question of whether the First
Amendment prohibits a plaintiff from recovering damages, under
Id. at 2434.
24 Id. at 2439 (White, J., dissenting).
241

24 Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2438.

Id. at 2431.
S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
246 Id. at 2516.
24

245 111
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state promissory estoppel doctrine, for a newspaper's breach of such
a promise.2 4' The petitioner, Dan Cohen, a paid Republican
political operative, approached reporters from the St. Paul Pioneer
Press Dispatch and the Minneapolis Star and Tribune and offered to
provide derogatory information about a Democratic candidate in
exchange for a promise of anonymity, which was given by both
Nonetheless, in their stories, both papers identified
reporters.2'
Cohen and he was fired from his job.249
Cohen sued the publishers of the Pioneer Press and Star
Tribune in state court alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and
The trial court rejected the newspapers'
breach of contract.'
argument that the First Amendment barred Cohen's lawsuit."5 The
court of appeals reversed the jury's award of punitive damages after
concluding that Cohen had failed to establish a fraud claim. 2
of
However, the court upheld the finding of liability for breach
3
contract and an award of $200,000 in compensatory damages.2A divided Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the
compensatory damages award based on the breach of contract cause
The court then considered whether Cohen could
of action.'
establish a cause of action on the theory of promissory estoppel, even
though that issue was never tried to the jury and was not briefed by
The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that
the parties.'
enforcement of the promise of confidentiality under a promissory
estoppel theory would violate newspapers' First Amendment
rights. z -6
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed and held that
the newspapers had no First Amendment defense against the
promissory estoppel cause of action."' The majority suggested that
247Id.
248Id.
249id.

' Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2516.
251Id.
252

Id.

213Id.
2U

Id.

Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2517. The question first arose during oral argument in
the Minnesota Supreme Court when one of the justices asked a question about
equitable estoppel. Id.
2% Id.
B5

257Id.

at 2520.

36
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the gathering and publication of truthful information about matters
of public concern enjoys no exemption from enforcement of generally
applicable state laws and rules such as the doctrine of promissory
estoppel.'
Thus, the enforcement of these general state laws
against the press is not subject to any stricter scrutiny than would be
applied against other persons or organizations.' 9 The majority
found that because the doctrine of promissory estoppel is a legal
principle generally applicable to the daily transactions of all the
citizens of Minnesota, and because the press was not singled out or
targeted in any way by its use in Cohen, the First Amendment does
not forbid its application to the press.'
The Court did not
reinstate the jury verdict awarding Cohen $200,000 in compensatory
damages, but remanded the case to the Minnesota Supreme Court to
determine whether the promissory estoppel claim had in fact been
established under state law and whether the state constitution
affected the liability of the press under that theory.26
Id. at 2518. The Court listed several situations in which general state laws
negatively affect the press' ability to gather and report the news and yet the press
is still bound to comply.
The truthful information sought to be published must have been
lawfully acquired.... Neither does the First Amendment relieve
a newspaper reporter for the obligation shared by all citizens to
respond to a grand jury subpoena and answer questions relevant
to a criminal investigation, even though the reporter might be
required to reveal a confidential source. The press, like others
interested in publishing, may not publish copyrighted material
without obeying the copyright laws.
Id. (relying on Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co, 433 U.S. 562 (1977);
and Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)).
2W id.
'0 Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518-19. The Court also rejected the respondent's argument that the case be dismissed because the promissory estoppel theory was not
argued or presented in the courts below and because the Minnesota Supreme
Court's decision rested entirely on state law issues. Justice White found that
whether or not the federal law issue was raised was irrelevant as long as it was this
issue that was considered and decided by the state supreme court. Id. at 2517.
Furthermore, the Court held that the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision that a
promissory estoppel theory would violate respondent's First Amendment rights
was clear evidence that the court's holding rested on federal law. The Court also
ruled that because the state supreme court held that Cohen could recover only
under the State-law promissory estoppel theory, "state action" had occurred for
purposes of triggering the application of the First Amendment. Id. at 2517.
261

id.
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Two dissenting opinions were filed in Cohen.62 Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall and Souter, suggested that
applying the estoppel doctrine and awarding compensatory damages
would be the equivalent of punishing respondents for publishing
truthful information that was lawfully obtained.'
Blackmun also
disagreed with the majority's suggestion that the press is always
subject to generally applicable state laws.2'
In contrast, Justice
Blackmun contended, Cohen should be governed by the principle that
"a state may not punish the publication of lawfully obtained, truthful
information absent a need to further a state interest of the highest
order."'
Blackmun stressed that the state's interest in enforcing
the newspapers' promise to their source was not compelling enough
to penalize the reporting of truthful information, legally obtained
about a public campaign.'
Justice Souter also filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor joined.267
Justice Souter
explained that in previous cases subjecting the press to laws of
general applicability, "commercial activities and relationships, not the
content of publication" were at issue.2' Applying facially neutral
laws to the press because of the content of what is published, Souter
explained, may severely restrict First Amendment rights.69 Justice
Souter criticized the majority holding for not measuring and
comparing the competing interests involved to determine the
legitimacy of burdening constitutional interests, thus departing
substantially from past precedent. 270
Justice Souter's dissent also responded to the majority's claim
Id. at 2520 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 2522 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2520 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

2M4id.

' Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2520 (citing Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S.
97 (1979)).
Id. at 2520.
27 Id. at 2522 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
M id.
m9 Id.
20

Cohen, 111 S.Ct. at 2522. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46

(1988) (prohibiting, under First Amendment, public figures from recovering
damages for emotional harm caused by publication of ad parody absent showing
of actual malice); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)
(First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize press from liability when it
broadcasts a performer's entire act without consent).
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that the restriction in Cohen was "self-imposed" by the newspaper's
promise of confidentiality.'
This argument, Souter explained,
neglected the fact that the underlying purpose of freedom of the
press is not to serve the members of the press, but to protect against
"government limiting of the stock of information from which
members of the public may draw."'
For as the Court has
recognized, "it is the right of the [public], not the right of the
[media], which is paramount."'
Souter acknowledged that in
some cases, particularly where a private individual is concerned, a
newspaper's breach of a promise of confidentiality could give rise to
liability.'" 4 In this case, however, Souter contended that the fact of
Cohen's identity clearly expanded the scope of information relevant
to the choices faced by voters in Minnesota in the course of the 1982
gubernatorial election, and imposition of liability could be justified
only by a very significant state interest, which the state failed to
adduce.'
The dissents in Cohen properly recognized the potential
danger to the First Amendment posed by the majority opinion,
particularly its reliance on the "law of general applicability"
rationale.276 The notion that a facially neutral law can be applied
without constraint to First Amendment protected activities was
applied last term to substantially weaken the Free Exercise Clause in
Oregon v. Smith.?' The same rationale could effectively reverse
numerous court precedents protecting First Amendment rights. For
example, the Virginia tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell' was clearly a law of
general applicability, but the Court there unanimously concluded
that it could not be applied to the content of a press publication
without meeting exacting First Amendment standards.'
Even the
' Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2522-23.
Id. at 2523.

2n

' Id. (quoting CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981)).
274 Id.

Cohen, 111 S.Ct. at 2523.
Id. at 2520 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 2523 (Souter J., dissenting).
27 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). See Mincberg, supra note 99, at 4-8.
v 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding that imposition of liability for intentional
infliction of emotional distress by publication of satirical critique violated First

Amendment).
2'

Id. at 50.
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libel law in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan' itself, it could be
argued, was a generally applicable law as to which, according to
Cohen, the First Amendment does not accord protection to the press.
The proper principle was correctly stated by Justice Souter in dissent:
so-called neutral laws of general applicability "may restrict First
Amendment rights just as effectively as those directed specifically at
speech itself,"' and should be analyzed accordingly by the
Court. 2
C. Leathers v. Medlock
The final freedom of the press case this Term, Leathers v.
Medlock,7 concerned whether the First Amendment prevents a
state from imposing its sales tax on only selected segments of the
media.'
The case involved a class action suit brought by
representatives of cable television claiming that their rights were
violated by the extension of an Arkansas sales tax to cable services,
while newspapers, magazines, and scrambled satellite broadcast
television services to home dish-antennae owners were excluded or
exempted.'
The cable television representatives contended that their
expressive activities are protected by the First Amendment and are
comparable to those of newspapers, magazines, and scrambled
satellite broadcast television.'
Accordingly, they contended that
the taxation of cable services, and the exemption or exclusion from
the tax of newspapers, magazines, and satellite broadcast services,
violated their constitutional rights under both the First Amendment
and under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 7
The Arkansas Chancery Court concluded that cable
television's necessary use of public rights-of-way distinguishes it for
constitutional purposes from other media, thus upholding the
' 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (protecting publisher who printed critical editorial about
public official under First and Fourteenth Amendment free press guarantee).
' Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2522.
22

Id.

w 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991).
Id. at 1441.

2

Id.
2M

Id.

287id.
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Shortly after this decision,

Arkansas adopted Act 769, which extended the sales tax to "all other
distribution of television, video or radio services with or without the
use of wires provided to subscribers or paying customers or users."
On appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court, cable petitioners again
challenged the State's sales tax on the ground that, notwithstanding
Act 769, it continued unconstitutionally to discriminate against cable
television. 9 The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not prohibit the differential taxation of different media, but
\does prohibit discriminatory taxation among members of the same
medium.2' Thus the court held that the Arkansas sales tax was
unconstitutional under the First Amendment for the period during
which cable television but not satellite broadcast services were
subject to the tax.29 '
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the State
Court's decision that the Constitution does not prohibit the
differential taxation of different media, reversed the court's holding
that discriminatory taxation among members of the same medium is
prohibited, and remanded to the State Supreme Court the question
of whether Arkansas' temporary tax distinction between cable and
satellite services violated the Equal Protection Clause.2 92 The
majority agreed that cable television engages in "speech" under the
'
First Amendment and is part of the "press."
However, the Court
also stressed that being taxed differently from other media does not
by itself raise First Amendment concerns.'
The majority
suggested that such differential taxation is suspect and threatens to
suppress the expression of particular ideas and viewpoints only if it
targets a small group of speakers or if the tax is based on the content
of a taxpayer's speech.29
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor contended that the
Arkansas tax presented none of these types of discrimination.2'
She suggested that the Arkansas sales tax was one of general

2s

Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1441.
Id. at 1441-42 (citing 1989 Ark. Acts 769 § 1).
Id. at 1442.

Id.
2

Id. at 1447.
Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1442.

294

id.

2

Id. at 1443-44.
Id. at 1444.

29

29
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applicability applying to a broad range of services unless included
within a small group of exemptions.'
The Supreme Court has
held that a generally applicable tax against the press is allowable, as
long as the press is not singled out or targeted by the tax.' The
majority in Leathers found "there is no indication... that Arkansas
has targeted cable television in a purposeful attempt to interfere with
its First Amendment activities," since no threat of restraint upon the
press as a watchdog of government activity has been created by the
tax.'
There was no danger of censorship, according to the
majority, because a large number of cable operators are involved,
because the tax was on a large number of systems offering a wide
variety of programming throughout the entire State, and because
there was no genuine fear that the tax could be used as a penalty for
particular speakers or particularideas.'
Finally, Justice O'Connor
also found no evidence that the sales tax was content based, since the
material on cable systems did not systematically differ from that
communicated by other media. 1
Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Blackmun joined,
dissented. 2 The dissent criticized the Court for "unwisely
cut[ting] back on the principles that inform our selective-taxation
precedents .

.

. ."'

Justice Marshall explained that according to

established Court precedent, "differential treatment, unless justified
by some special characteristic of the press, . . . is presumptively

unconstitutional," and must be struck down "unless the State asserts
a counterbalancing interest of compelling
importance that it cannot
' 4
achieve without differential taxation."
Justice Marshall maintained that the majority was endorsing
discrimination against like-situated media by allowing selective
taxation so long as the more heavily taxed medium is not too "small
297
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Leathers, 111 S. Ct. 1444. See Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of
California, 493 U.S. 378 (1990); Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S.
221, 229 (1987); Minneapolis Stars Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r, 960 U.S. 575,
586 n.9 (1983).
299 Leathers, 111 S.Ct. at 1444.
Id. at 1445.
2

0Id.

Id.
Id. at 1448.
Id. (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comn'r of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983)).
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in number."' This focus on numbers, suggested Marshall, ignores
the potential for abuse inherent in the State's power to discriminate
based on the identity of the medium.' The dissent maintain that
differential taxation among like-situated media that is "justified by
nothing more than the State's desire for revenue, violates
government's obligation of evenhandedness," and interferes with the
process by which citizens' preferences for information formats
evolve.4 '
In fact, as the dissent suggests, the Court's opinion in Leathers
poses potential dangers to First Amendment principles. By allowing
a state to tax one medium over another, the Court has given the
states the freedom to favor those media that they like and punish
those that they dislike. As Justice Marshall pointed out,
So long as the more heavily taxed medium is
sufficiently "large," nothing in the majority's test
prevents the State from singling out a particular
medium for higher taxes, either because the State
does not like the character of the services that the
medium provides or because the State simply wishes
to confer an advantage upon the medium's
competitors.m
This stands in marked contrast to previous long-established Court
decisions, which "recognized that differential taxation within an
information medium distorts the marketplace of ideas by imposing
on some speakers costs not borne by their competitors."'
The only safeguard established by the majority is the
principle that a state must avoid discriminating against "too small"
a number of media actors.310 The definition of what is too small
Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1451.
36
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7 Id. at 1450.
Id. at 1452.
3' Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1450 (emphasis in original). See Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (noting competitive disadvantage arising from
differential tax based on newspaper circulation); Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (holding that inflicting a competitive disadvantage on a
disfavored medium violates the First Amendment command that the government
shall not impede the free flow of ideas).
310 Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1451.
3
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remains unclear; while a tax on only three magazines in a state is
improper, according to the Court, a tax on 100 cable systems is
permissible, and there appears to be no clear line in between.31'
The majority did suggest that the heavily taxed medium must be
large enough to provide a wide variety of programming throughout
a State, thus posing no risk of affecting a limited range of views.312
In finding that differential taxation of 100 cable systems posed no
such risk, however, the majority disregarded evidence in the record
in Leathers which provided "ample support for the conclusion that the
State's cable operators make unique contributions to the information
market."1" The decision in Leathers, by permitting a state to levy
a differential tax treatment on particular media without a compelling
reason, raises troubling First Amendment concerns.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions during
1990-91 illustrate only too clearly that the overruling of prior
precedents is far from the only risk to contitutional liberties posed by
the increasingly conservative Court majority. The Court did not
expressly overrule any previous First Amendment precedents during
its last term. Decisions such as Rust, however, limit directly First
Amendment freedoms and, if extended further by the Rehnquist
Court in the future, pose an even greater threat to fundamental First
Amendment principles.
311Id.

See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987)

(holding that Arkansas' magazine exemption, which meant that only three Arkansas magazines pay any sales tax, offended the First Amendment because of
selective taxation of the press through the narrow targeting of individual members).
312 Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1451.
313Id. (discussing testimony of cable operator that it offered "certain religious
programming" that "people demand .. .because they otherwise could not have
access to it" and evidence of unique cable broadcast of local city council meetings
and Spanish language programming).

